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Note
Restoring Truth: An Argument to Remove the
Qui Tam Provision from the False Marking
Statute of the Patent Act
Craig Deutsch*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2009, a patent attorney’s attempt at a billion
dollar verdict under the false marking statute of the Patent
Act1 was denied by the Federal District Court of the Eastern
District of Virginia.2 In addition to finding for the defendant,
Solo Cup Company, the court interpreted the false marking
statute in a way that all but eliminated any incentive for a
plaintiff to seek recovery under the statute.3 The lack of
penalty given by the Eastern District of Virginia and other
courts seems to have rendered the statute ineffective and has
made a meaningful recovery difficult to obtain.
Section 292(a) of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever
marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection
with any unpatented article the word ‘patent’ or any word or
number importing that the same is patented, for the purpose of
deceiving the public . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $500 for
every such offense.”4 Subsection (b) of § 292 allows anyone to

 2010 Craig Deutsch.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School. B.M.E.
2008, University of Minnesota Institute of Technology.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
2. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (E.D. Va.
2009).
3. See id. at 801 (indicating an offense is defined as a decision to falsely
mark as opposed to each falsely marked article constituting an offense). The
Federal Circuit has clarified that the statute requires each false marked item
to be penalized as an offense. See Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
4. § 292(a).
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sue under the statute.5 The informant or relator, i.e. the
individual bringing a so-called qui tam action, recovers half the
profits while the other half is reserved for the use of the United
States.6
The goal of this Note is to demonstrate the minimal
effectiveness provided by the qui tam provision of the current
false patent marking statute and propose changes to effectively
police the false marking of unpatented articles. Section I traces
the history of qui tam actions generally, their adoption into the
Patent Act of 1854, and the subsequent development of false
patent marking jurisprudence over the past 164 years. The
current statute, as interpreted by various state and district
courts, effectively eliminates the qui tam nature of the statute
by removing the incentive for an uninjured relator to bring
suit.7 However, based on the limited harm false patent marking
appears to inflict on the public and the patent system, along
with the inefficiencies that result when a lawsuit proceeds
where an injured plaintiff is not present, it appears that the qui
tam nature of the current statute has a greater capacity for
harm than good.
II. BACKGROUND: A STATUTE CENTURIES IN THE
MAKING
The original false marking statute was introduced by
Congress in the Patent Act of 1842, prescribing a fine of “not
less than one hundred dollars, with costs” and allowing anyone
to bring suit.8 Although unique to modern United States
statutory law,9 qui tam actions that allowed an individual to
bring suit regardless of injury or privity were once not
uncommon.

5. § 292(b).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st Cir.
1910); Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790; A.G. Design & Assocs. v. Trainman
Lantern Co., No. C07-5158RBL, 2009 WL 168544, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 23,
2009); Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57134 (S.D. Tex., July 29, 2008), vacated, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
8. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
9. In fact, only three true qui tam actions in addition to the false
marking statute remain. 25 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006).
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A. ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT AND ABOLITION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS
Originating in Roman and Anglo-Saxon law,10 qui tam is
short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur”11 meaning “‘who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.’”12 Qui tam actions gained
widespread use in fourteenth century England as the only way
to adequately enforce national policies with limited resources
over a vast geographic area.13 Parliament deputized its citizens
to enforce qui tam provisions directed at everything from the
price of wine to bribery of jurors.14
As the number of qui tam actions in England increased, an
industry of professional informers developed.15 Such informers
were not looked upon favorably, to say the least. In referring to
informers, Sir Edward Coke used such descriptive language as
“viperous Vermin”16 and “turbidum hominum genus,” a wild or
disordered class of men.17 Professional informers were in
search of private gain, often coming at the expense of the
impoverished.18
The “unsavory reputation”19 of the informers appears to be
warranted. Because the effectiveness of qui tam statutes was
based on a private reward to an uninjured party, the incentive
of an informer often conflicted with the policy underlying a
particular statute. As a result, individuals were often punished
where no punishment was warranted and fraudulently accused
of wrongdoing when no wrong had been committed.20 It was not
uncommon for an informer to entrap an unsuspecting victim to
commit a crime in order to receive the statutory reward.21
Additionally, informers often attempted to maximize profits by
10. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication
of Qui tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 566 (2000) (“Roman criminal law
relied on a system of prosecution by private citizens, known as delatores.”).
11. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 769 n.1 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Beck, supra note 10, at 567.
14. Id. at 568.
15. Id. at 567.
16. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 194 (W. Clarke & Sons 1809) (1628).
17. Id. at 191.
18. Beck, supra note 10, at 578.
19. Id. at 577.
20. See id. at 581–83.
21. Id.
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neglecting to bring a settlement to the court’s attention.22 In
doing so, an informer could keep money that would otherwise
be given to the King under the statute.23 The history of the qui
tam statute in England lives up to its reputation of little more
than “legalised blackmail.”24
Further, the subject matter of many qui tam statutes was
looked upon unfavorably by England’s citizenry to begin with.
Several qui tam provisions were enacted, for example, to seek
out and fine anyone practicing a religion not in accordance with
the Church of England.25 Later provisions, such as the Sunday
Observance Act of 1780, created such disfavor that they helped
lead to the repeal of English qui tam legislation.26
Ultimately, because of the abuses inherent in a system of
private enforcement, qui tam statutes in England rapidly
declined as a permanent police force developed.27 As Gerald
Hurst, a member of the House of Commons, stated in
encouraging the abolition of qui tam legislation:
[I]t is wrong for a free country to allow an informer to seek redress for
his own pecuniary advantage in respect of a public wrong in which he
has no direct personal interest or concern. A wrong to the State
should surely be atoned for by a penalty payable to the State alone.28

This statement was met with virtually unanimous support,
and the Common Informers Act of 1951 eliminated English qui
tam statutes29 and the myriad abuses they accompanied.
B. INTRODUCTION OF QUI TAM ACTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES
Despite the eventual dismissal of qui tam actions from
England, several qui tam statutes were enacted in the early
United States. Initial statutes were directed at policing the
behavior of various government officials and, as in England,
many later statutes governed economic activities.
22. Id. at 580.
23. Id.
24. 293 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1934) 843–46 (statement of Mr.
Hurst),
available
at
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1934/nov/06/commoninformer#S5CV0293P0_19341106_HOC_271.
25. Beck, supra note 10, at 592–93.
26. Id. at 596.
27. Id. at 601.
28. Gerald Hurst, The Common Informer, 147 CONTEMP. REV. 189, 189
(1935).
29. Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39, § 1 (Eng.).
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The most widely utilized qui tam actions in United States
law were brought under
the False Claims Act.30 The False Claims Act of 1863 was
enacted in order to protect the federal government from fraud
by Civil War contractors shipping overpriced and defective
goods to the Union army.31 At the bequest of President
Lincoln,32 legislation was passed creating a penalty of double
the amount of damages suffered by the government plus an
additional $2,000 for each violation.33
There were several rationales for providing a qui tam
action for such a crime. First, individuals working in the
defense industry were presumably most likely to possess
knowledge of fraud or other wrongdoing.34 The qui tam
provisions created an incentive for such individuals to act as
whistleblowers, bringing hidden crimes to light.35 As Senator
Howard stated in discussing the qui tam provisions of a later
version of the False Claims Act:
The bill offers . . . a reward to the informer who comes into court and
betrays his coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that
class . . . . In short, sir, I have based the [qui tam provision] upon the
old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to
catch a rogue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I have
ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.36

Second, the qui tam action was seen as a way to promote
efficient government use of resources.37 By creating an
incentive for a private individual to prosecute an offense, the
government’s burden of enforcement was reduced.
The number of qui tam statutes in operation in the United
States has dwindled. Today only four statutory vehicles for qui
tam actions remain.38 The most widely used qui tam statute is
30. Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues Posed by
the Qui tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89,
90–91 (1996).
31. Jaime McMahon, Qui tam Can, Qui tam Can’t: An Analysis of
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2001).
32. Hamer, supra note 30, at 90.
33. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986).
34. Hamer, supra note 30, at 90.
35. Id.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
37. Beck, supra note 10, at n.64.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
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provided as part of the False Claims Act.39 Since 1986,
approximately $2.698 billion has been recovered by the Justice
Department through qui tam actions under the Act.40 The
remaining three qui tam statutes have seen less action. 25
U.S.C. § 201 provides a cause of action and half of the recovery
to the informer against a person for unlawful dealings with
Indians under Title 25.41 The Copyright Act provides a cause of
action for false copyright notice.42 And, of course, the Patent
Act allows a qui tam action against whoever falsely marks as
patented an unpatented article.43
C. THE FALSE MARKING PROVISION OF THE PATENT ACT OF 1854
The original Patent Act was introduced by the first
Congress in 1790 and was transformed by the 1836 Patent Act
into substantially the system recognized today. 44 Recognizing
the power that a patented article held in the marketplace,
patent marking was sometimes abused by unscrupulous
producers.
In order to avoid infringement of another’s patent, it was
wise, just as today, to perform a patent search before
introducing a new product. However, in the early days of the
patent system, a patent search necessarily entailed a trip to the
Patent Office, no doubt a substantial burden in the 1800s. To
solve this logistical dilemma, Congress enacted a requirement
that patented articles be marked as such, thus providing notice
to the public and diminishing the risk of inadvertent
infringement.45 However, the reliance of the public on whether
or not an article was marked as patented allowed patent
marking to be abused. By falsely marking its products as
patented, a marketer could attempt to create an image of
superiority to consumers while preventing potential
39. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
40. Beck, supra note 10, at 638.
41. 25 U.S.C. § 201.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1326.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 292.
44. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 2007).
45. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“The marking statute serves three related purposes: 1) helping to avoid
innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the public
that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the public to identify whether an
article is patented.”) (internal citations omitted).
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competitors from entering the market for fear of infringement.
In order to “defend[] the patentees in their rights,”46 § 5
was introduced into the Patent Act, imposing a minimum fine
of $100 for an unpatented article marked as patented.47 As
elaborated by an early court, the patent system privileges an
inventor with the exclusive right to an invention.48 The false
marking statute is intended to assist in maintaining the
integrity of the patent system by preventing public deception
with regards to such a privilege.49
D. THE ELEMENTS OF FALSE MARKING UNDER § 292
The elements of a violation of the original statute have
persisted since its inception with only minor changes. The
current false marking statute, codified at § 292 of the Patent
Act, can be separated into four distinct elements, each of which
raises a number of issues.50
The first two elements are relatively straightforward. The
relator must show a marking importing that an object is
patented.51 Such a marking could include the words “patent,”
“patentee,” or other words or numbers, and, after the passage of
the 1952 Patent Act,52 “patent applied for” or “patent
pending.”53 The language may appear on the article itself or in
“advertising in connection”54 with the article. As evidenced
from the text of the statute, the critical factor is that the
marking convey that the article is patented.
To satisfy the second element, the marking must be
“falsely affixed” 55 to the article. A violation of the statute can
only occur by the party that “does the actual marking and

46. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 833 (1842).
47. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 5, 5 Stat. 543, 544.
48. See Nichols v. Newell, 18 F. Cas. 199, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1853) (No.
10,245).
49. Id. at 199–200.
50. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
51. Id.
52. S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2424. The legislative history provides little insight into why the statute was
amended to include such language or why such language was not originally
within the scope of the statute.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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affixing.”56 A subsequent seller of a falsely marked article who
has not mismarked the article does not violate the statute.57
The third element of the false marking statute requires
that the article is in fact unpatented.58 An article is unpatented
under § 292 if it is not covered by at least one claim of the
patent that is marked upon the article.59 Thus, a proper
analysis requires first a determination of the claim scope of the
patent in question followed by a determination of whether at
least one claim reads upon the article.60 If the article is not
within the scope of at least one claim of the patent, the article
is falsely marked. When multiple patents are marked on the
article, § 292 requires that at least one claim from every patent
read on the article.61 An article may also be deemed
“unpatented” for purposes of the statute where a patent
application is filed but rejected or not yet issued, a method of
producing the article is patented but the article itself is not,62
the patent has been invalidated, or the article was previously
covered by a patent but the patent has subsequently expired.63
The fourth and final element requires the plaintiff to show
intent to deceive on the part of the defendant.64 The element of
intent is often the most difficult to prove because, as in most
areas of litigation, rarely is direct evidence of such intent
available.65 In Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp.,
56. Felt v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 84, 87 (D. Minn.
1952).
57. See id.
58. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
59. Id. at 1352.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1358. It appears, however, that there would be no violation as
long as it was clear that the patent referred to a method and not the article
itself. “This is not a case where the cDNA library products were marked with
language stating that the products were made by the ‘methods’ of any patents.
Rather, the record shows that the marking language included the statement:
‘This product is the subject of U.S. Patent No. 5,668,005.’” Id. at 1357.
63. It is harder, however, to show intent to deceive when the patent
previously covered the article but has since expired. See Pequignot v. Solo Cup
Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 797–98 (E.D. Va. 2009).
64. Clontech Labs., 406 F.3d at 1352.
65. See Pequignot, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 796–97 (“[A] high bar . . . is set for
proving deceptive intent.”); see also Star Scientific, Inc, v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he inference [of
deceptive intent] must not only be based on sufficient evidence and be
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the Federal Circuit defined the requisite intent to deceive as “a
state of mind arising when a party acts with sufficient
knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently
that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that
the statement is true.”66 Thus, there is no strict liability for the
inadvertent mismarker. However, the fact that an unpatented
article is marked as patented, coupled with knowledge of the
falsity of the marking will warrant an inference that the
requisite intent to deceive was present.67
After the elements of a violation have been established, the
question of damages remains. The original false marking
statute prescribed a minimum fine of $100. The minimum fine
was changed to a higher maximum fine of $500 because, as the
senate report claims, it was “interpreted as a maximum”68
anyway. The statute calls for a fine to be imposed “for every
such offense.”69
The question of what constitutes an offense under § 292
vaulted a 2007 lawsuit by a patent attorney to the forefront of
the blogosphere. Matthew Pequignot filed a complaint under 35
U.S.C. § 292 against Solo Cup Company (“Solo”) for continuing
to mark products after the applicable patent numbers had
expired and for marking products with a statement that the
article “may be covered” by a patent. Citing the language of the
statute, Mr. Pequignot sought an award of $500 “per false
marking.”70 As the court indicated, Solo marked billions of its
products with the expired patent numbers.71 A quick run of the
numbers indicates Mr. Pequignot was likely to come out ahead
if his claims were successful.
In defending itself, Solo first argued that marking an
article with an expired patent cannot, as a matter of law,

reasonable in light of that evidence, but it must also be the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence . . . .”); Brose v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the plaintiff
bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive).
66. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citing Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alterative v. United States, 239
U.S. 510, 517–18 (1916)).
67. Id. (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
68. S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2424.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006) (emphasis added).
70. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 650 (E.D. Va. 2008).
71. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (E.D. Va. 2009).
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constitute a violation of the false marking statute.72 The court
found unpersuasive Solo’s arguments that expired patents did
not fall within the statute’s language or that public policy was
better served by exempting expired patents from the false
marking statute.73 As the court stated, such an exemption
would injure the public’s ability to “assume ‘the status of the
intellectual property’ by the simple presence of a ‘Patent No.
XXX’ marking.”74
More important than whether or not expired patents are
within the false marking statute, Solo raised the constitutional
question of whether Mr. Pequignot could properly bring suit
where he had not sustained injury from Solo’s actions.75
Furthermore, Solo argued that even if Mr. Pequignot did have
constitutional standing to pursue an action under § 292, the
action would violate the Take Care clause of Article II, § 3 of
the Constitution.76 Citing the Supreme Court, the Eastern
District of Virginia held that, as a partial assignee of the
government’s claims through a qui tam action, Mr. Pequignot
had Article III standing.77 The court also found no separation of
powers problems because the first qui tam actions were enacted
“before the ink on the Constitution was even dry”78 and the
Executive Branch itself had intervened in the present case to
defend the constitutionality of the statute.79
Solo’s luck would change quickly, however. The facts of the
case before the court did not favor Mr. Pequignot. There was no
dispute that expired patent numbers had been marked on
several of Solo’s products, and thus whether a violation
occurred hinged upon whether Solo acted for the purpose of
deceiving the public.80 The court rejected the argument that
72. Pequignot, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
73. Id. at 652–54.
74. Id. at 654.
75. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 715 (E.D. Va. 2009).
76. Id. As the court indicated, “[T]he ‘Take Care’ Clause of Article II . . .
requires that the President ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’ This provision, which grants the Executive Branch the power to
enforce federal law, is part of the scheme of separation of powers, in which
Congress passes laws, the President enforces them, and the judiciary
interprets them.” Id. at 724 (internal citation omitted).
77. Id. at 724.
78. Id. at 726.
79. Id. at 728.
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
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knowledge of falsity is sufficient to establish conclusively intent
to deceive. The court found persuasive Solo’s argument that it
had developed and implemented a policy to replace
manufacturing molds containing the expired patent numbers
but that the process would take place gradually as the molds
wore out due to an expected cost of $500,000.81
Although there was “no need to address the meaning of
‘offense’ in the damages provision of § 292,”82 the court provided
its opinion on the matter anyway because of the probability
that such commentary “could significantly effect [sic] the
incentives for qui tam actions” in the future.83 The court
indicated several plausible options including defining each
falsely marked article as an “offense,” each decision to mark as
an “offense,” 84 or, citing a novel approach employed by one
court, each week of false marking as an “offense.”85 The
Eastern District of Virginia chose to define “offense” as the
“distinct decision to falsely mark”86 stating that, if Solo had
possessed the requisite intent to deceive, Solo would have
committed at most three offenses punishable by no more than
$1500.87
Notwithstanding that the court’s statements were dicta,
the court was absolutely correct that such an interpretation of
“offense” will greatly affect the incentive to bring a qui tam
action. However, after finding that § 292 was indeed valid and
enforceable, and clearly espousing the critical role the statute
serves in protecting the patent system and the public, the
Eastern District of Virginia seemed to have little difficulty in
rendering the qui tam nature of the statute moot as applied. By
imposing a penalty in the range of only hundreds of dollars a
court certainly dissuades private individuals from bringing any
future qui tam actions. Since the Solo decision, the Federal
Circuit has taken the opportunity to correct the varied
interpretations given to the statute and has indicated that the

81. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793–94 (E.D. Va.
2009).
82. Id. at 801.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 802 n.19 (citing Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. The Nautilus
Group, Inc., No. 1:02CV109TC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24153, at *7 (D. Utah
Mar. 23, 2006)).
86. Id. at 801.
87. Id. at 804.
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statute requires a fine on a per article basis.88 It remains in the
courts discretion, however, to impose a penalty anywhere from
the maximum of $500 to as low as “a fraction of a penny” as the
court deems proper.89
In 1896, Odin B. Roberts offered prophetic words in a
Harvard Law Review note regarding the fate of the false
marking statute:
It is clear, after a consideration of the cases under this statute, that
the strictness of construction adopted by the courts, the heavy burden
of proof which is imposed upon the informer, and the obvious
difficulty of proving a fraudulent intent on the part of a defendant,
combine to dissuade a person from undertaking the expense and
trouble of litigation merely for the sake of plunder. Only a genuinely
interested or inspired individual is likely to turn informer; and others
are easily dissuaded from lodging complaint so soon as the true
nature of their prospects is made clear to them.
It is more than likely, therefore, that actions qui tam under the
patent statutes will continue to be a rarity in the Federal courts.90

Qui tam statutes rose to prominence in England only to be
completely barred from use.91 Similarly, the qui tam statutes in
the U.S. have decreased to the point that § 292 of the Patent
Act is one of only four remaining qui tam actions.92 While cases
such as Solo prove Odin’s statement is all too true, the good
news for the patent system and the public at large is that the
presence of alternative means for recovery, coupled with the
limited damage that a violation of the statute causes to begin
with, means that little harm is felt by removing the qui tam
incentive from the false marking statute.
III. ANALYSIS
In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., the Eastern District of
Virginia raises important issues that go straight to the core of
the relevancy and efficacy of the false marking statute of the
Patent Act. If the policies the statute was built upon are sound,
that is, that false marking deceives consumers, stifles
88. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
89. Id.
90. Odin B. Roberts, Actions Qui tam under the Patent Statutes of the
United States, 10 HARV. L. REV. 265, 274 (1896).
91. See Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (Eng.).
92. See supra note 9.
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competition, chills innovation, and ultimately harms the patent
system, Pequignot and others like him should be lauded as
defenders of invention and compensated accordingly with
generous verdicts. It is more likely, however, that the instinct
that hesitates to allow recovery by a plaintiff lacking both
injury and privity is justified. Pequignot and other informers
should not be able to recover under a qui tam statute where the
harm to the public and the patent system is limited. Where the
injury is in fact extensive, however, the injured party should
recover. In addition to the constitutional questions raised by a
qui tam action for false patent marking, it appears there are
sufficient mechanisms in place to deter the false marking of
unpatented articles and provide remedy to those injured by
false marking.
A. HOW AND TO WHAT DEGREE DOES FALSE MARKING HARM
THE PATENT SYSTEM?
In analyzing the language and application of the false
marking statute, the first step
necessarily involves looking at the harm the statute was
created to prevent. From the day the statute was originally
enacted “to protect the rights of patentees,” courts and
commentators have reiterated the same general statements in
support of the statute.93 As the court in Pequignot stated,
“[p]atent markings are an essential component of [a carefully
created patent] system.”94 They prevent burdening potential
inventors and consumers with the hassle of looking up patent
markings to determine validity.95 But, however wrong it may
be for a producer to deceitfully mark an article, the harm to the
patent system and to the public appears to have been at least
partially overstated.
1. Harm to the Policies Underlying the Patent System
The standard argument for creating a harsh penalty
against false marking is that false marking undermines the
very purpose of the patent system: incentivizing invention.
93. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“The marking statute serves three related purposes: 1) helping to
avoid innocent infringement; 2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the
public that the article is patented; and 3) aiding the public to identify whether
an article is patented.”) (internal citations omitted).
94. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Va. 2008).
95. Id.
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According to this argument, would-be inventors will avoid a
particular area upon seeing a marked article for fear of a costly
infringement suit down the road.96 An invention marked with a
patent marking “is, in effect, a ‘no trespassing’ sign,” a court
has said.97
This argument is unpersuasive for two related reasons.
First, it is true that patent marking is analogous to a notrespassing sign with regards to the invention, but not
necessarily with regard to the entire article that is marked. The
presence of a patent marking may provide little or no
information as to the actual subject matter covered by the
patent. A potential inventor with the foresight to avoid
infringement will presumably understand that the patent may
apply to a feature that is less than completely intertwined with
the function of the article. Even if the marked patent is
accurate and valid, a patent search must be performed before
an inventor can make an informed decision about entering or
avoiding a market.
Second, the entire patent system is based on public
disclosure and accessibility of prior inventions. There is little
better display of the patent system operating effectively than
when an inventor properly “design[s] around” an existing
patent to avoid infringement.98 “[I]ndeed one of the purposes of
the patent disclosure system is to encourage this valuable form
of competition.”99 Such innovation cannot take place unless
patents are easily accessible. The more accessible such
information is, the less of a threat false marking causes. If
looking up a patent imposes too great a burden on a would-be
inventor, perhaps the exchange of exclusive rights granted for
public disclosure that the patent system is based upon needs to
be recalibrated. 100
96. See Rick Weiss, Op-Ed., The ‘Patent Pending’ Problem, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2009, at A13.
97. Pequignot, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
98. See Rehrig Pac. Co. v. Norseman Plastics Ltd., No. SACV 03-00470JVS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27566, at *81–82 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2003) (citing
State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir.
1985). (“[c]onduct such as Smith’s, involving keeping track of competitor’s
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional
equivalents is the stuff of which competition is made and is supposed to
benefit the consumer.”)).
99. Id.
100. When information is not readily accessible, even accurate and lawful
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2. Harm to the United States Government
Another argument for harshly penalizing false marking is
that, because the government is the exclusive grantor of patent
rights, false marking harms the government itself. Marking an
unpatented article as patented commits a fraud upon the
government. But, however fraudulent falsely marking an
article may be, it seems the harm to the government is
minimal. By marking an article as patented, one is telling the
public that the article has some unique feature and that the
requirements of the patent system have been satisfied. Despite
the falsity of such a statement when the article is in fact
unpatented, the value of the patent system is not likely to be
diminished.
In many scenarios, false statements made by an individual
member of the market may have a negative effect on the
perception consumers have of competing products. If a
competitor makes false statements about its product, for
example that it is made of fine cotton when in fact it is made of
an inferior polyester blend, legitimate sellers of fine cotton may
be harmed by a reduced perception of the quality of fine cotton
among consumers.101 But does the same scenario play out in
the context of false marking? That is, does marking an
unpatented article as patented lessen the value of articles that
truly are patented? The answer must be no. A patent confers no
government endorsement as to the quality of the invention or
suitability for a particular purpose. A patent merely recognizes
that an invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and disclosed in
compliance with a number of statutory requirements.102 That
the patent marking was never intended to confer special status
on the patentee in the marketplace indicates the patentee is
not losing anything they were entitled to in the first place.
3. Harm to the Consumer and the Competition
Generally, there is at least a perception among the lay
public that an article marked as patented is superior in some
way to unpatented articles. It is this perception that false
markers attempt to take advantage of. As the Pequignot court
stated, “[t]o the extent that there is any real injury caused by
false marking, it is to competitors of the entity abusing patent
patent marking can unduly chill innovation and deter competition.
101. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 761 cmt. a (1939).
102. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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markings.”103 To the extent that consumers make purchasing
decisions on the basis of patent coverage, truthful competitors
are harmed. There is some doubt, however, whether patent
coverage affects consumer decision making. One court denied
recovery explicitly on the basis that false marking was not
likely to affect purchasing decisions.104 Of course whether a
patent marking is likely to affect a consumer’s decision likely
depends on such factors as the complexity of the product and its
cost, increases in either of which likely render deception less
probable. However, in the event that consumers purchase on
the basis of false representation and competitors are harmed,
remedies would be available under a false marking statute
absent a qui tam provision or through alternate means such as
the Lanham Act.105
Ultimately, there is no doubt that the intentional false
marking of an unpatented article is wrong and should be
remedied where injury results. However, a qui tam relator
seeks to impose punishment even where injury is absent. It
seems that decisions such as Solo that minimize the qui tam
incentive for a potential relator is consistent with a limited
level of harm that often ensues from a violation of the statute.
B. IS § 292 CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?
Solo asserted in its defense against Pequignot’s claims that
the qui tam nature of the false marking statute is objectionable
on constitutional grounds.106 Article III of the Constitution
limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of “Cases” or
“Controversies.”107 The Supreme Court has elaborated that
Article III requires three distinct elements for a plaintiff to
have proper standing.108 First, a plaintiff must show an actual
injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical.109 Second, the
103. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 729 (E.D. Va. 2009).
104. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., No. H-05-4127, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57134, at *24 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
105. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del.
1986); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1976); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 408 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
106. Pequignot, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
108. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
109. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
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plaintiff must be able to show a causal link between the
defendant’s alleged behavior and the injury.110 Third, the
requested relief must be likely to remedy the injury.111
Historical arguments are often proffered in support of the
constitutionality of qui tam actions. The First Congress, several
members of which were involved in the drafting of the
Constitution, enacted several qui tam statutes.112 Additionally,
a long line of cases have consistently validated qui tam
actions.113 Although qui tam statutes originated at the same
time as the Constitution, this is not per se evidence of validity.
“‘The long standing tradition [of the qui tam action] . . .
provides no evidence that it fulfills the tests of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability.’”114
The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of
qui tam actions, at least with respect to qui tam actions under
the False Claims Act.115 In Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court stated that
the qui tam reward provided an interest in the outcome of the
action but that it was only a “byproduct” of the suit and thus
was insufficient to satisfy the injury portion of the three prong
test.116 However, the Court found that a qui tam plaintiff has
standing as an assignee of the United States’ injury suffered by
violations of the False Claims Act and reiterated the historical
significance of qui tam actions.117 According to the logic of the
court, so long as the government’s alleged injury would satisfy
Article III, Congress has authority to assign a claim to a
private plaintiff.118
Such a solution, however, seems to circumvent the
765, 771 (2000) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
110. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976)).
111. Id.
112. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 726 (E.D. Va. 2009).
113. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,
714 F. Supp. 1084, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Associated Indus. of New York
State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Pub. Interest Bounty
Hunters v. Bd. of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga. 1982);
Calderwood v. Mansfield, 71 F. Supp. 480, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
114. Hamer, supra note 30, at 95.
115. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 771 (2000).
116. See id. at 775.
117. Id.
118. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
46 (16th ed. 2007).
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underlying purposes of the standing requirement.119 Arguing
that standing is an essential element of the separation of
powers, Antonin Scalia stated that “‘the law of standing
roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of
protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the
majority, [while excluding courts] from the even more
undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function . . . .’”120 Such a concern is easily observed in
the historical use of qui tam actions in England, where
informers sought recovery without deference to prosecutorial
discretion that would routinely be exercised if the Executive
branch were bringing an action.121
The logic of the Supreme Court is further tensioned when
applied to § 292 because, as the Eastern District of Virginia
stated, false patent marking “does not involve a proprietary
injury to the United States . . . . To the extent that there is any
real injury caused by false marking, it is to competitors of the
entity abusing patent markings.”122 The government has little
injury to assign. Competitors could be granted a private right of
action against a false marker without the enactment of a qui
tam statute.123 Considering the limited benefit provided by the
qui tam nature of the false marking statute, coupled with the
prospect of upsetting the constitutional balance served by the
standing doctrine, Congress would be prudent in limiting
recovery to competitors or others directly injured by a false
marking.
C. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE FALSE MARKING
STATUTE?
It appears that, as applied, § 292 has lost its identity as a
qui tam statute under which anyone can bring a lawsuit. If the
maximum recovery suggested by many courts continues to be
accepted, there is virtually no situation in which the award to a
relator will outweigh the cost of litigation absent exogenous
considerations. Even when the fine for a violation of the statute
119. Hamer, supra note 30, at 96.
120. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 46 (quoting Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element in the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 881 (1983)).
121. Beck, supra note 10, at 583–84.
122. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009).
123. Id.
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is prescribed on a per mark basis as the Federal Circuit has
recently stated, a sufficient award is not guaranteed. Congress
can intervene to restore the statute to its original form. On the
other hand, perhaps Congress should affirm explicitly what the
courts have done implicitly in eliminating the incentive for a
qui tam relator to bring suit. After all, qui tam actions have not
exactly withstood the test of time. The increasing scarcity of qui
tam statutes evinces the lack of utility they offer. Moreover, the
historical reasons for the creation of qui tam provisions no
longer persist. Unlike the False Claims Act, premised in part
on the idea that internal whistleblowers will most effectively
bring hidden frauds to light,124 false marking is not usually
detectable only by someone with inside information.125 Further,
the decreased reliance on patent marking through increased
accessibility of patent information has mitigated the threat
posed by unscrupulous markers. Ultimately, the unfair
advantage, if any, that a vendor obtains by selling an
unpatented article as patented is addressed at the lowest cost
by careful consumers or through litigation by individuals
directly affected by the false marking.
1. The qui tam nature of the statute hinders enforceability
One possible revision of the false marking statute is to
interpret the statute in a more penalizing manner, imposing a
fine on each falsely marked article. In late 2009, the Federal
Circuit did exactly that. Such a decision seems consistent with
the plain language of the statute which establishes a maximum
penalty of $500, leaving it to the court’s discretion to weigh the
appropriate level of punishment based on the harm and
culpability of the defendant. The qui tam nature of the statute
remains, however, presenting several problems to an otherwise
logical solution. It seems that the statute is better off without
the assistance of “10,000 lawyers.”126
The absence of false marking cases at the circuit court level
can be interpreted as an indicator that the statute is
underutilized. Indeed, only ten appellate cases have been heard
in the life of the statute.127 The reason for this phenomenon is
124. See supra notes 35–36.
125. Perhaps in the case of items marked patent pending, a false marking
would be difficult for the public to detect at least for 18 months, after which a
publication should have issued.
126. 89 CONG. REC. 7606 (1943) (statement of Sen. Langer).
127. Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
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attributable in part to the reasons that Odin B. Roberts
predicted in 1896.128 Because of the qui tam nature of the
statute, courts construe the statute with complete strictness,
increasing an already difficult burden of proving fraudulent
intent.129 Due to the difficulty in recovery, qui tam plaintiffs
are hesitant to bring a suit. This fact evinces that almost all
false marking cases have been between direct competitors.
However, despite the presence of plaintiffs who appear to be
directly injured by the defendant’s actions and who will likely
benefit from a favorable decision, courts are hesitant to apply
qui tam statutes in favor of plaintiffs. The historical abuses
that have accompanied qui tam actions as well as the possible
presence of a plaintiff with questionable standing to pursue an
action in the court has encouraged courts to strictly construe
qui tam actions in favor of defendants.130 Courts further limit
recoverability under the false patent marking statute due to its
criminal nature.131 It seems the statute could be a more
effective mechanism against false marking absent a qui tam
provision.
Assume, hypothetically, that the statute was interpreted
by the courts to allow recovery for each falsely marked article
and the plaintiff’s burden of proving intent was reduced. The
number of qui tam actions under the statute would certainly
increase. A scenario directly analogous to such a proposition
took place under the False Claims Act. In 1986, the recovery

2005); Arcadia Mach. & Tool Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1124
(Fed. Cir. 1986); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506 (1st Cir.
1910); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980);Brose
v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1972); Filmon Process Corp. v.
Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Boyd v. Schildkraut
Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1991); G. Leblanc Corp. v. H. & A.
Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962); Graffius v. Weather-Seal, 165 F.2d
782 (6th Cir. 1948); Santa Anita Mfg. Corp. v. Lugash, 369 F.2d 964 (9th Cir.
1966).
128. Roberts, supra note 90, at 274.
129. Id.
130. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1942)
(“That dislike has been implemented in court decisions for informer statutes
have been construed with utmost strictness.”).
131. See French v. Foley, 11 F. 801, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“ The rule that
penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself.’”) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (5
Wheat.) (1820)).
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available under the statute was greatly increased132 with
dramatic results. No recovery was had by a qui tam relator
under the statute in 1987.133 A mere ten years later, 533 suits
were filed and the government recovered $629.9 million.134
There is little doubt that a similar result could be achieved
with the Patent Act. Qui tam relators have generally been
looked upon with skepticism, however, and for good reason. The
abuses present in the English system of qui tam enforcement
would likely reappear, even if to a lesser degree, with an
increased opportunity to reap a large payout.
The most important factor in arguing against increasing
the incentive for a qui tam relator to bring an action under the
false marking statute, however, is that the increased costs of
such a statute would be unwarranted based on the limited
degree and limited scope of harm caused by false patent
marking in cases involving qui tam plaintiffs. The addition of
more stringent penalties will likely impose costs that are
greater than, or at least unlikely to remedy the damage of,
those caused by false marking.135 As one scholar explained:
[D]eterrence, or deterrence plus compensation, can never be the
exclusive goals of a regulatory regime. . . . At some point, additional
enforcement efforts or stiffer penalties impose costs on the public, on
regulated individuals, or on third parties that threaten to outweigh
any corresponding deterrence and compensation gains. A rational
regulatory system seeks an optimal level of enforcement—one that
adequately fulfills the statutory purposes while minimizing social
costs.136

There is little room for argument that potential qui tam
relators prowling for a vulnerable false mark would spur
manufacturers to honestly and accurately mark their products.
But the benefit is unlikely to be worth the resulting cost to

132. See The False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562,
116 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733).
133. Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui tam Provisions and the Public
Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 955 (2007).
134. Id.
135. As the Solo Cup court stated, the damage, if any is present, is felt by
competitors. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728 (E.D. Va.
2009). Of course the false marker will be deterred from illicit marking even if
the penalty is being paid to an uninjured relator and the government.
However, the cost passed on to consumers may not be worth the benefit of a
marketplace free of inaccurate patent markings. Limiting suits to competitors
or other damaged parties, as the statute currently achieves as applied,
prevents such wasted costs from being incurred.
136. Beck, supra note 10, at 609–10.
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manufacturers, a cost eventually passed on to consumers in
some form.
The facts of the Solo case provide an appropriate example
of the magnitude of the costs at issue. Correcting the marking
of Solo’s products was estimated to be $500,000 dollars.137 Of
course, the case was decided on the grounds that Solo lacked
specific intent to deceive the public. However, imagine a
slightly altered fact scenario in which the defendant similarly
lacks the intent to deceive but has not yet implemented a
formal plan of correcting the markings, thus lacking the
evidence Solo was able to proffer in its defense. Should the
defendant in this case be penalized for false marking? Perhaps
the answer is yes where a plaintiff who has been injured by the
false marking is bringing the lawsuit. Further, where a
competitor has been injured, consumers have necessarily been
injured as well. A lawsuit under § 292 would provide remedy to
the harm while deterring prohibited conduct in the future. In
the event that a qui tam relator is bringing suit where an
injured competitor is not present, however, perhaps a penalty is
not warranted. Where an injured party is absent, the costs of
the lawsuit itself would be inefficient with no resulting benefit
to the public. Such an action would never be brought absent an
artificially created award.
Consider as another example a situation in which a vendor
clearly intends to deceive consumers with a false patent
marking but fails to do so. Surely some penalty should be
imposed for the fraudulent intent. But since there is no injury,
there is no injured plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. Allowing a
relator to profit in such a situation seems unwarranted since
there is little public benefit that can result from the relator’s
enforcement. Ultimately, the optimal level of enforcement is
most easily determined by the actions of parties injured by
false marking rather than by a relator seeking to profit from a
violation of the statute.
Even if the harm of false marking is seen as warranting
greater punishment than the current false marking statute
provides, the qui tam nature will likely act as a hindrance to an
effective statute. The ability of an uninjured party to bring an
action has cornered the courts into an interpretation of the
false marking statute that provides minimal punishment. By
137. Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (E.D. Va., 2009).
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removing qui tam relators, the statute could be amended to
properly address the harm of false marking while reducing the
risk of an analogous increase in unwanted social costs of
inefficient litigation.
2. False Patent Marking as False Advertising
In many ways, false patent marking exhibits very few
differences than any other form of false advertising. Labeling
an unpatented product as patented is comparable to labeling a
product or its promotional materials with the message that the
product contains an exclusive feature that can only be found in
the particular product. Because of the similarities, false
advertising laws such as § 43(a) of the Lanham Act provide a
suitable model for discussing the most desirable embodiment of
a false marking statute.138 Even better, the Lanham Act itself
can provide a mechanism to a party that finds itself injured by
false marking.
Five elements are required for recovery under the Lanham
Act in the patent context.139 A plaintiff must prove that:
1) the defendant has made false or misleading statements of fact
concerning his own product or another’s; 2) the statement actually
deceives or tends to deceive a substantial portion of the intended
audience; 3) the statement is material in that it will likely influence
the deceived consumer’s purchasing decisions; 4) the advertisements
were introduced into interstate commerce; and 5) there is some causal
link between the challenged statements and harm to the plaintiff.140

Several courts have held that false or misleading claims of
patent protection undoubtedly violate § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.141 In fact, the elements of the Lanham Act seem
particularly well suited to address the issue of false marking.
First, requiring some level of harm to the plaintiff removes the
skepticism courts have exhibited in allowing uninjured relators
to recover. Further, the plaintiff must show that the false
marking is somehow material. A claim will be denied under the

138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
139. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
140. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd.
of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir.1999); See also Zenith,
182 F.3d at 1347.
141. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del.
1986); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1976); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 408 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
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Lanham Act even if a product marking is clearly false where no
injury results from the marking.142 And, importantly, the
evidence of causation a plaintiff must introduce to support a
claim depends upon the relief sought.143 As the Eighth Circuit
noted, “[a]n injunction, as opposed to money damages, is no
windfall to the commercial plaintiff.”144 Because money
damages primarily benefit the competitor, however, a higher
standard of causation is required.145 Ultimately, § 43(a)
provides a form of relief against false patent marking without
the problems associated with the qui tam nature of the false
marking statute of the Patent Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the scope of false patent marking, one thing is clear: the
qui tam provision is little more than a remnant of history that
limits the efficacy of the statute. Courts such as the Eastern
District of Virginia appear correct in strictly construing the
statute so as to prevent a plaintiff from easily recovering where
no injured party is present. Increasing the penalty of false
patent marking only benefits informers at a cost to the public
while providing little additional remedy where an injury has
actually occurred. The ability of qui tam informers to bring suit
does little more than hinder the recovery of victims who truly
have suffered an injury as a result of false patent marking.
Although the qui tam provision of the false marking statute
raises serious constitutional questions, these questions need
not be addressed because the statute appears better off free of
qui tam litigants. Absent a provision allowing qui tam litigants
to pursue an action, courts will be free to appropriately enforce
the statute without fear of attracting informers looking to cash
in on violations of the law.

142. Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
143. Surgeons, 185 F.3d at 618.
144. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 n.7
(8th Cir. 1980).
145. Id.

